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2Using Real Options to Help Build the Business Case for
CRM Investment
Abstract
While CRM (Customer Relationship Management) practices are being adopted widely,
research suggests that most CRM programmes fail in their dual objective of creating
superior customer value and increasing profits for the firm.
This article questions the basis on which the business case for CRM investments is made.
It highlights shortcomings with traditional cash-flow analysis (DCF and NPV), how these
shortcomings inhibit successful CRM implementation and why senior managers may
consider using Real Options thinking to address the limitations of DCF and NPV. A
simulated case study illustrates how the use of Real Options in addition to NPV/DCF can
impact decision making when preparing the business case for CRM investments. Such
complimentary analyses help ensure that senior managers focus on both the activities that
generate immediately-identifiable cash as well as the harder-to-quantify strategic aspects
of customer relationships that generate longer-term customer value and profits.
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1Using Real Options to Help Build the Business Case for CRM Investment
Synopsis
High rates of CRM failure can originate right at the business case stage where the
investment decisions are made. Traditional discounted cash-flow analysis alone does not
value or focus managerial attention upon the strategic long-term benefits of CRM:
learning from customers, building customer advocacy and retention, and reduced market
uncertainty. Through a simulated case study analysis, we illustrate how the addition of
Real Options to discounted cash-flow can improve CRM investment decision making,
encourage managers to verify critical assumptions and reduce both investment and
business risk.
Introduction
The financial framework most often used in preparing business cases for Customer
Relationship Management (CRM) may, perversely, inhibit such programmes from
achieving their strategic and business objectives. Arguably, the traditional cash-flow
analyses based upon Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Net Present Value (NPV)
calculations are too limited a basis on which to make CRM investment decisions. This is
because they undervalue returns and focus management attention on short-term cash-flow
when, perhaps, the main benefits of customer relationship investments lie in building a
strategic customer relationship asset. In other words, the long-term benefits of closer,
deeper relationships with selected customers are difficult to quantify in cash terms since
they can lead to reductions in the volatility of sales, market uncertainty and business risk.
2Given that CRM investments are usually strategically significant, with a value in the
range of $60 million to $200 million for a highly complex installation which can take up
to 3 years to install (Ebner et al, 20021), the risk of business failure needs to be fully
quantified. In the 1990s, the climate for CRM investment was more favourable and firms
invested without fully considering these risks (Rigby et al, 20022). Their research
suggests that 55% of all CRM projects haven’t produced results, and some 20% of users
report actual damage to long-standing customer relationships.
Today, business leaders are demanding a more rigorous approach to developing and
presenting the business case for CRM investment. As a consequence, the senior
managers involved in delivering the business case, usually a project team drawn from
Marketing, Sales, IT and Customer Service, need to address fully the questions, “What
steps can we take to reduce the uncertainty in the business case for CRM?” and “How do
we reduce the risk of business failure if we adopt a more customer-centric approach
through CRM? ”
In this paper, we first identify the potential benefits of CRM investments to both
customers and the firm. Then we explore the limitations of Discounted Cash Flow (DCF)
and Net Present Value (NPV) in assessing how the CRM business case is presented. To
counter the problems of risk and uncertainty left largely unanswered by a cash-flow
analysis, we introduce the idea of Real Options as a risk-reduction step to help build the
business case for CRM investment. This we do through a simulated case study of a
telecom. equipment manufacturer actively considering a CRM investment. Initially, we
3develop a range of business case scenarios for the firm, together with a cash-flow
calculation for each. These scenarios show wide variability, depending upon the business
assumptions made, and we conclude that they significantly undervalue the likely effects
of the firm’s CRM investment and look very high risk indeed.
To help mitigate the uncertainty of such a large-scale investment, we introduce the idea
of using Real Options in conjunction with traditional cash flow analysis to quantify the
effects of trialling CRM before scale up as an alternative pathway for building the case
for CRM investment. Although Real Options have been used to manage other IT
investment risks (Benaroch, 20023), as far as we are aware, this is the first time Real
Options have been applied in the context of a CRM investment.
We close the paper by exploring the managerial implications of how this combination of
cash-flow and Real Options helps reduce uncertainty in the CRM investment decision by
introducing greater flexibility and a fact-based means of quantifying the business
benefits.
The Promise of CRM
The promise of customer relationship management is captivating. For customers, CRM
offers the potential for customised solutions, superior service and reduced costs over the
lifetime of their relationship with the firm since shared knowledge of their business
strategy, buying preferences and processes can be developed in a more systematic
fashion. For the firm, the ability to gather customer data swiftly, identify the most
valuable customers over time and increase customer retention through CRM is a highly
desirable strategy since it positively impacts the firm’s profitability (Reinartz et al,
420044). Reinartz and co-researchers define CRM as “a systematic process to manage
customer relationship initiation, maintenance and termination across all customer contact
points to maximize the value of the relationship portfolio”. Thus, CRM offers a potential
win: win scenario for both the firm and its customers. However, the underlying reasons
why both customers and firms choose to restrict the width of their business relationships
require a fuller explanation of the mutual benefits of CRM from the perspective of the
customer and of the business.
The customer perspective
Economic theory predicts that customers will buy from many suppliers to reduce costs
and improve service (Palmer, 20005). In reality, they willingly restrict their choice to a
few preferred suppliers or brands (Gummesson, 19986; Sheth, 19957) with whom they
either trust or collaborate closely (Christopher, 19988, pp.190-191).
Whilst it seems that customers act contrary to their best economic interests, economists
acknowledge that perhaps customers are acting rationally and avoiding transaction costs
through relationships (Williamson, 19819). Even where transaction costs are not a major
consideration, customers may yet calculate that the total lifecycle costs of owning certain
assets or procuring services are better managed through relationships (Degerature et al.,
199910).
In some markets, customer retention can be explained through the avoidance of switching
costs; costs associated with switching from one product or service to a new one (Shapiro
5and Varian, 199811). For example, companies may be reluctant to change software
because of the attendant costs of retraining staff, repopulating databases and potential
conflicts with other systems. Relationships with companies that listen, learn and respond
through effective CRM practices can improve the customer’s procurement experience.
Where this happens, a virtuous cycle can develop: committed customers invest further in
their focal suppliers by increasing their expenditure ( Verhoef, 200312) and suppliers
continually invest in process and quality improvements to support such strong and
enduring customer relationships (Pine, Peppers and Rogers, 199513)
In summary, many customers prefer to deal with a small core of supplier-partners than to
procure important supplies in the open market. Relationships are considered to add value
and reduce costs, and buyers demonstrate a preference for building stable relationships
over pure market transactions for all but straight commodities or low risk purchases.
The business perspective
In recent years, businesses have paid increasing attention to the profit impact of customer
retention (Wyner, 199614; Johnson, 200215). Reichheld (199616) makes a compelling
argument that it is more profitable to focus on retaining customers rather than just
maximising market share. Reichheld also maintains that these effects increase over time,
so that the profitability of retained customers grows exponentially. Small changes in
customer retention rates create a disproportionate increase in profitability.
It is the incentive of increasing customer retention and profitability through better CRM
6practices which often drives firms to develop a more customer-centric strategy.
However, effective customer retention is contingent upon market segmentation as the
starting point for the development of a firm’s CRM strategy (Corner, 2002a17). Research
suggests that most firms ‘carry’ many unprofitable customers who don’t generate
margins commensurate with the cost to serve them (Peppers and Rogers, 199718).
Peppers and Rogers argue that, through market segmentation and CRM, firms will be
able to identify unprofitable customers and discontinue subsidising them so that resources
can be redirected to retaining profitable customers, as well as attracting potentially
profitable ones. For businesses supporting a large number of unprofitable customers,
realigning the asset and cost base towards the segment of profitable customers can reduce
the total asset base while increasing revenue. The impact upon shareholder value is
obvious.
Recent research suggests that retained customers can also increase shareholder value by
reducing the volatility of the firm’s cash flow (Ryals, 200219). Serving large numbers of
transient customers makes cash flow volatile and creates fluctuations in short term assets,
such as inventory and receivables. Investors demand greater return on investment to
compensate for volatile cash flow. In addition, long-term customers may contribute
valuable and unique learning to the firm (Wilson, 199620). Knowledge gained by a firm
from its customers through CRM over time can be translated into marketing action
tailored to individual customers. Once a customer sees a supplier acting on information it
has been given through CRM, there is a strong disincentive to start again with a
competitive supplier. Learning from customers is particularly important in developing
7new products – there will be fewer expensive failures when customers can input early
into the product development process (Thomke and von Hippel, 200221). This reduced
development risk (or improved success of innovation) builds cash flow and reduces
overall business risk. Indeed, many CRM advocates say that customers generate much
more than cash flow; they ‘teach’ firms how to improve their business (Womack, Jones
and Roos, 199022).
While the promise of CRM is beguiling, the concomitant benefits of a more customer-
centric strategy can only be achieved through investing in technology, people and
processes; both these CRM investment costs and the risk of business failure throughout
the transition period can be very high.
Next, we explore what the main assumptions are in developing the business case for
CRM and how the financial analysis is usually presented.
Value Exchange and the CRM Business Case
CRM creates symbiotic value for both customers and the business. The more customers
‘teach’ their suppliers, the more these businesses can support and respond to them. This
value exchange process lies behind the most critical business assumptions about the CRM
business case:
1 Trust is developed. Research suggests trust is developed through repeated
experiences that meet or exceed customer expectations (Constable, 199823).
2 The CRM programme has integrity. Customers will continue ‘teaching’ firms
about their needs and preferences for as long as they perceive benefit and therefore
the CRM business plan must identify how the firm will learn and respond.
83 There is mutual commitment. The business case must identify how and why
customer commitment will increase over time, and how this increased commitment
results in increased retention and reduced churn (Corner, 2002b24). Moreover,
commitment can be leveraged commercially through increased sales, referrals and
references. Research suggests that committed customers are likely to buy more from
their preferred supplier through choice (Coyles and Gokey, 200225).
We argue that traditional financial analysis forces marketing and sales management to
identify the outcome of the customer learning process at the outset of the CRM business
case. So, senior managers write these assumptions into their sales targets, and design
customer relationships around what the firm wanted to sell to them in the first place
(Maklan, 200026). This compromises the win: win scenario that underpins any CRM
strategy and, as we highlighted earlier, research suggests that most firms fail to achieve
their targeted ROI from CRM investments (Fournier, Dobscha, and Mick, 199827;
Olazabal, 200228; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 200429).
Traditional Financial Analysis of CRM
Most CRM business cases are built upon traditional financial investment analysis tools;
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and its associated calculation of Net Present Value (NPV)
(Ryals, Knox and Maklan, 200030). Investment policy in most firms is to create
shareholder value by determining whether expected returns on any investment exceed the
risk-adjusted cost-of-capital for that type of investment.
In this financial model, CRM represents an investment in technology, people, new
9processes and marketing aimed at stimulating an increase in cash flow from customers in
future years through higher revenues at lower sales and marketing costs (Knox et al,
200331). This cash flow is discounted by an appropriate charge for capital to enable
managers to compare investment and return on a like-for-like basis; that is, the present
value of each. If Net Present Value (NPV) is positive when cash-flows are adjusted for
the true cost of capital, then risk-adjusted return exceeds cost of investment.
Sophisticated users of DCF estimate a residual value for the asset at the end of the
planning period.
NPV is based upon estimated incremental cash-flows that are uncertain and there are no
guarantees that the business case will be delivered once the programme(s) starts.
However, the forecasting process assumes that the business is a portfolio decision maker,
making a series of investment decisions based on expected value. This is a risk reduction
strategy; the business makes a large number of investments, none of which will expose it
to unacceptable risk levels (Copeland, Koller and Murrin, 199532). If each business case
is honestly made, then investments that return less than forecast are balanced by those
that exceed their estimates. Across a large number of investments, provided the charge
for capital is appropriate, the use of DCF and NPV calculations should lead to decisions
that increase shareholder value.
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Limitations of Using DCF and NPV alone when estimating the benefits of CRM
Investment
A number of critical assumptions made by these modelling techniques are not necessarily
true for CRM investment. For instance:
1 DCF does not encourage measuring or fully valuing the non-cash value of customers
which, consequently, may remain understated. Customers are worth more than cash;
CRM should encourage customers to recruit new customers, to act as test markets for
new ideas and to teach firms how to continually improve their operations. These
customer relationship impacts can be substantial. For instance, the world’s first
telephone bank, first direct, claims 33% of new customers are generated from referral
(Parmenter et al., 199733). Software companies have long valued co-operative
product development with leading customers and some firms may reduce prices to
prestigious customers who are willing both to improve and endorse their offering.
2 The portfolio decision maker assumption may also be suspect. If an industry is in
flux and there is a clear imperative to move to a more customer-centric business
model, the firm may not have the luxury of repeated experimentation. When
customer-centric change is a ‘bet your business’ initiative, DCF fails to value the
consequence of getting it wrong; the greater the volatility (range of possible returns),
the greater the option value of trialling, learning and postponing full commitment
(Luehrman, 199834).
3 Where there is great uncertainty around the outcome, a business case that looks at the
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NPV of a best estimate scenario is not always helpful (Copeland and Keenan,
199835). When dealing with a very wide range of outcomes, discounting the cash
flows of a mid-point estimate may fail to address adequately the variability and risk
of the investment.
Applying Real Options to Overcome These Limitations
Real Options have recently been developed as a financial analysis tool to overcome the
limitations of traditional financial analysis and the inability of DCF to reflect the value of
learning and risk management. An option is the right (not the obligation) to buy or sell
an underlying asset, traditionally a financial asset, at some future time. Real Options are
so called because the underlying asset is real, not financial. They are useful for valuation
in situations in which investment decisions can be deferred, piloted or scaled; this
flexibility has value not just because an organisation can earn interest on the capital it
retains but also because deferring a decision until the business situation clarifies reduces
the uncertainty surrounding that decision (Buckley and Tse, 199636).
The Real Options approach modifies DCF to capture the value of flexibility, learning and
risk management in a project such as a major IT installation (McGrath and MacMillan,
200037). The value of flexibility is the option to scale a project up (or down) as the
opportunity and risks become clearer over time (McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow,
200438). In other words, the total value of the project is the NPV plus the value of the
option to scale up, scale down, or to pull out (Exhibit A).
Insert Exhibit A near here
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Proponents of Real Options claim that they offer a superior pricing technique and
decision support analysis to NPV alone; they are a particularly useful technique for
evaluating major, future investments. Real Options have recently been demonstrated to
have applications in marketing (Dias and Ryals, 200240) and can offer significant benefits
to marketers. For instance, by using Real Options, financial numbers can be put on
difficult, hard-to-quantify issues, such as the value of learning from customers and risk
reduction in business decisions. By adding back the value of learning and by reducing
the risk of investment through exercising a Real Option, senior management is more able
to demonstrate that apparently unattractive, or marginally attractive, CRM investments
can sometimes have merit.
Like other researchers exploring the potential of Real Options in business investments
generally (Boer, 200041, McGrath et al, 200442) and IT in particular ( Li and Johnson,
200243, Kulatilaka et al, 199944), the limitations of traditional financial analysis and the
potential contribution of Real Options can be demonstrated through a simulated case
study. For the purposes of this paper, our simulated case is Westel1, a telecoms
hardware manufacturer struggling with a CRM business case.
Developing the CRM Business Case at Westel
Mary Green, Marketing Director of Westel, is leading a multi-disciplinary project team
(the Team) tasked with preparing the CRM business case for a programme they believe
1 Westel is a simulated case developed from actual incidents in our research and consultancy work in
CRM. The issues discussed in the case are realistic in scope and scale.
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necessary for the firm’s survival. Westel is a multinational company which provides
telecoms. network hardware. It has an extensive product and service range, and an
established reputation in solving complex, demanding problems. Its high-end products
form the telecoms. backbone of many of its customers and command high margins. Once
installed, Westel can confidently expect the lion’s share of upgrades, extensions and
ancillary services.
Currently, its annual turnover is £500 M, it achieves a 40% Gross Margin and a 5% Net
Contribution; SG&A and R&D represent 35% of turnover. Westel is under attack from
new competitors who combine solution design with hardware, installation, and network
management. These firms are disintermediating Westel from its customers and the Board
is worried that the firm will become a low-margin, hardware supplier to these upstarts.
Mary is asked to put together a strategic response. How should Westel leverage its
undoubted capabilities and extensive offerings to become a broad-based solution provider
to its best customers?
The Team divides customers into three categories profitable; marginally profitable with
substantial growth potential; and unprofitable with no prospect of becoming profitable
(Peppers, Rogers and Dorf, 199945). In the first two categories, Westel is only selling
one-third of what it ‘should’ be achieving. Each business unit is focusing on its own
offerings rather than total customer need. The firm is neither maximising opportunities
across business units nor matching sales and marketing expenditure to the opportunity.
Each business unit pursues its own targets. To address this, Westel needs to change from
14
being product- to customer-centric. So, the Team recommends the creation of a key
account management function to:
1 Integrate Westel offerings into bespoke, value-added customer solutions
2 Co-ordinate marketing, sales and service expenses, aligning them to priority
customers and development programmes
3 Exploit the potential for referral. The Team knows that their customers network
extensively and that Westel is not actively fostering customer referrals.
This programme requires substantial investment in sales and marketing, training, new
technology and considerable reorganisation of the business.
Estimating the CRM Business Case Using DCF
The Finance Director had advised Mary to use 10-year cash flow forecast with a discount
rate of 15%. The costs of implementing a comprehensive CRM programme at Westel are
easy to estimate; £227 M over ten years of which £129 M would be spent in the first three
years alone (see notes to Appendix 1 for more details of these costs under “Successful
CRM”). The Team is less confident about estimating incremental revenue. They
estimate that turnover could increase dramatically through more effective cross-selling,
customers acting as reference sites and customers directing Westel to develop as yet
unforeseen new products and services. Mary is also convinced that Westel would reduce
marketing and sales costs because she knows it is less expensive to serve retained
customers than to continually recruit new ones. Although research costs would also rise,
revenue would rise faster because customers would be helping to direct research thus
making it more cost-effective. Finally, the Team believes that developing more
comprehensive, long-term customer solutions as a result of a CRM programme would
15
undoubtedly lead to an increase in gross margins.
In preparing the business case, the Team estimates the NPV of three scenarios:
1. “Successful CRM”: The full CRM programme increases turnover and margin
dramatically. Research, sales and marketing expenditures increase in absolute
terms but fall as a percentage of turnover. The result of these effects is that in 10
years Westel almost doubles its turnover and increases its profit four-fold.
Investment in R&D increases by over forty percent in cash terms. (See Appendix
1 for a fuller explanation of Westel’s projected income statements and NPVs of
the three scenarios).
2. “No Change”: There is no investment in CRM and consequently there is no
change to the current business results with respect to revenue, cost or research
investment.
3. “Gradual Decline”: There is no investment in CRM but new competitors erode
revenue and margin. In ten years, Westel’s revenue is 25% lower and the firm is
less than half as profitable. Marketing, Sales and R&D spending are fixed as a
percentage of turnover, but the 25% reduction in turnover leaves Westel less able
to invest strategically and may compromise its future.
Despite the dramatic difference in the outcomes generated by the three scenarios, the
NPV estimates demonstrate only a small difference between them in value (Figure 1).
This is particularly true when comparing the “Successful CRM” and “No Change”
scenarios, the comparison most salient to the Board.
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Insert figure 1
On an NPV basis alone, one cannot justify the huge investment in CRM that the Team
believes is necessary for Westel’s future prosperity. The problem is that nobody can
prove with any credibility how well CRM will work or how much risk the business is at
from competition. They have no basis in fact or experience for their estimates of CRM
benefits. For example, the Team’s belief that future product ideas would generate cost
savings from better customer engagement is difficult to evaluate using DCF. To make
the case for CRM using traditional financial analysis, Mary would have to increase her
revenue forecasts well beyond levels that Westel’s sales and marketing team could
reasonably hope to achieve.
The Team is convinced that once a more customer-centric organisation was in place,
Westel would find opportunities to reduce non-value-adding costs and identify winning
new business ideas. Westel would be at the ‘top-table’ with its customers - gaining
inside knowledge both of their evolving needs and by leading through innovative
business practices. Without this access, Westel would lose its edge. Moreover, such a
transformation takes time; if Westel does not begin implementing CRM soon, it may be
too late by the time the business case becomes apparent.
The Team ponders what to do. Should they be even more ambitious about the revenue
and margin upside even though they had no firm basis? Could they scale down CRM
investment and still justify their growth assumptions? Should they try to convince the
Board with ‘soft’, unquantifiable benefits? Should they try frightening the Board by
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painting a vision of doom if Westel allowed competitors to consolidate their hold on its
best customers?
Analysis of the Westel’s CRM Business Case
Westel needs to become customer-centric. But the only way to make a compelling
business case based upon NPV is to make heroic assumptions about increased revenue,
reduced cost and the risks of ‘do nothing’. Forecasting large increases in revenue based
on beliefs, experts’ claims and hard-to-verify estimates of best practice is risky.
Moreover, it assumes that you know the outcome of stronger customer relationships
before entering into them. Locking Westel into pre-identified, cross-selling programmes
and new product launches risks compromising the trust and learning which is at the heart
of CRM. Investing more in the current business practices might generate more immediate
return. Smaller initial investments giving short-term returns are favoured in NPV
calculations because the discount rate – the time value of money – dramatically reduces
benefits that are realised only in the long term.
But what will happen to Westel if Mary and Board are right about the increased
competitive threat? How should senior managers assess the risk of being too cautious? If
they fail to implement CRM now, can they come back later or will they have missed the
chance forever?
DCF, not surprisingly, is best used when the situation can be described in cash flow
terms. It fails to value what Westel will learn from its customers – a major CRM benefit.
It also favours the short over the long term. DCF/NPV is not good at assessing the longer
18
term, and potentially fatal risk facing Westel. If the competitive threat materialises, then
DCF will lead Westel to seriously underestimate the benefits of the CRM investment case
and by the time this is understood, it may be too late to implement the far-reaching
changes needed to respond in a timely fashion.
The Westel Solution: Applying Real Options
The Team should avoid the use of heroic assumptions in the business. They are likely to
be controversial when held up to scrutiny by experienced directors and the sales function.
Moreover, if they are accepted, the pressure for immediate sales increases to customers
will undermine any serious attempt at learning and responding to customers flexibly. The
problem Mary faces is how to present financial data in a manner that promotes an
intelligent discussion with the Board, identifies the key assumptions and risks of the
investment and builds an informed consensus on the basis of valid information.
Reviewing the project, the Team generates a fourth scenario. Rather than an all-or-
nothing rollout of CRM, they identify a limited number of key accounts with which CRM
will be trialled. The ability to trial CRM indicates that a Real Option on CRM is present.
The value of this option is the value of flexibility which reduces the risks associated with
the CRM investment whilst increasing senior manager’s learning about the returns of
CRM for the firm. The Team estimates that it will take three years to implement and
“read” the CRM trial after which time, the Board can make the decision whether or not to
discontinue the trial (or scale it up) according to the firmer evidence provided by the
Team’s analysis of the key accounts involved.
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The DCF calculation of this fourth scenario, Trial CRM, is made on the basis of a three
year trial costing £36 M in terms of CRM investment. If the trial is successful, CRM can
then be extended quickly across the business. However, if the trial is unsuccessful,
Westel would not extend CRM and the firm will have “lost” £36 M which puts much less
investment at risk than the £129 M required for immediate implementation of CRM
across the business during the same three year period. (See Appendix 1 and notes for the
detailed, year-by-year calculations of Trial CRM investments and Net Contribution).
On a DCF basis alone, this option does not appear to make sense (Figure 2). The impact
of the delay is to reduce the overall NPV of the CRM project to £107 M; much lower
than a possible £133 M for the Successful CRM scenario and only marginally better than
the Gradual Decline scenario. This perhaps indicates why so many organisations have
plunged into full-scale CRM rollout with sometimes costly results. Conventional DCF
approaches understate the true value of trialling because they ignore the option value.
Insert Figure 2
However, the Trial scenario buys flexibility for Westel. It allows the firm to validate the
Team’s forecast of the impact upon revenue and costs of the CRM programme and be in
a position to extend the programme across the business in a timely fashion should these
benefits prove real. Flexibility and the attendant risk reduction are not cash flows and,
hence, are omitted in a pure DCF comparison of the four scenarios. Mary must work
with Finance to value the flexibility contained within the fourth scenario, Trial CRM.
First, they need to calculate the numerical values for the five factors that affect the value
of this real CRM option. These are shown in Figure 3:
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Insert Figure 3
Then, Mary and her finance colleagues use the numbers in Figure 3 to work out the value
of Westel’s CRM Real Option. Because of the complexity of options valuation models,
they decide to calculate an approximate option valuation using look-up tables based on
the Black and Scholes equations set out earlier (p11). (Brealey and Myers36).
To find the relevant column, the asset value (£107m) must be divided by the present
value of the exercise price (£195m discounted at r of 15% = £102.2m). This comes to
1.05 (£107m/£102.2m).
To find the relevant row, the volatility of the underlying asset must be multiplied by the
square root of the time period for which the option is available (.32 x √3) = 0.554.
Applying these numbers to the look-up tables, the Team is able to determine that the
value of Westel’s CRM option is approximately £25 M.
Mary’s argument to the Board is summarised in Figure 4 which shows the NPV of each
scenario, including the new scenario four, Trial CRM, which also has an option value.
When the value of the flexibility provided by trialling CRM is added to the cash flow
generated, the total value of scenario four is very marginally lower than the potentially
much higher-risk option, scenario one, of rolling out a full CRM project immediately.
Insert figure 4
By calculating the value of Westel’s CRM option, the Team is in a much stronger
position to recommend that the firm market tests CRM with a limited number of
customers over a three year period in order to validate the business case assumptions
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about revenue and costs. The firm should then be in the position to implement a full-scale
CRM programme shortly afterwards. With three years experience of CRM, Westel will
be able to reduce the wide spread in NPV estimates for CRM. In other words, the firm
will be able to reduce the risk of its CRM investment. This risk will also be reduced
through market testing of CRM that will allow Westel to build competencies, resources
and a track record of learning relationships with customers.
The discussion of risk in respect of scenario one, Successful CRM, raises an issue about
the interest rate used in the calculations. The same interest rate is used in all four
scenarios. However, common sense suggests that the Successful CRM scenario is more
risky than the others and, as such, it should attract a higher cost of capital (discount rate).
This would have the effect of reducing the NPV of Successful CRM whilst increasing the
option value associated with Trial CRM since, as discussed above, the value of a Real
Option varies positively with the interest rate. Thus, the approach taken to valuing
Westel’s CRM option may be slightly conservative.
The identification of a supportable financial value for the factors, which are not captured
in the DCF, allows the Board to engage in an informed debate and make a rational
assessment of the value of CRM. It addresses the Finance Director’s concern about
adding such values into a DCF analysis but does not fall into the trap of either ignoring
the value or incorporating it in a non-transparent manner through heroic sales growth
assumptions.
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Managerial Implications of using Real Options for CRM Project Evaluation
There are two important implications for CRM project managers concerning how they
make the business case for CRM and the way in which they structure and implement
subsequent CRM programmes. Many CRM projects fail, indicating that they are risky. In
these circumstances, making a case using DCF / NPV will misrepresent the real value of
projects that contain options. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the option value.
Making a case for CRM based solely on DCF may deter senior managers from investing
in CRM because the potential is understated.
The Westel example demonstrates the limitations of financial models (DCF/NPV) which
senior managers typically use when building the business case for CRM. Faced with the
constraints of considering only the immediately identifiable cash flows, firms may tend to
underestimate the true value of the benefits derived from CRM, such as learning from
key customers and building their trust. This means that business leaders may not invest
in such a programme, leaving their firms vulnerable to competitors. Real Options can
help demonstrate the true potential of CRM investment.
The CRM business case is a major strategic document and not merely a financial
forecasting exercise. It represents a fundamental change to the business and should be
evaluated as a strategic, risky and contingent investment in an unknown future. The
challenge for senior managers is to promote a discussion that identifies the extent to
which their business must move from a traditional “make and sell” model to “listen and
respond” in an unknown future and real options thinking can help to generate this
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discussion.
The second implication concerns the way in which managers structure and implement
CRM programmes. The Westel case illustrates the benefits of options thinking and of
structuring CRM programmes to create options to defer, pilot or upscale major CRM
investments. Without options thinking, companies may fail to build into the programme
sufficient flexibility to learn from customers, which could compromise the huge
investment that CRM requires. It can, therefore, enable a rational discussion of risk and
flexibility in the search to optimise the structuring of CRM investments and the
implementation of programmes. Moreover, in the time before the option must be
exercised, the three years of the Westel Trial CRM in this case, senior management
attention will be focused on validating the key assumptions built into the business case.
This will promote a rigorous, fact-based means of quantifying CRM benefits.
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Exhibit A
The value of an option depends on five factors:
1. The value of the underlying asset (Ps)
2. The amount it costs to exercise the option (E)
3. The interest rate (r)
4. The period for which the option is available (t)
5. The volatility of the underlying asset (Nd)
The value of an option is given by the equation:
P0 = PsN(d1) – E N(d2)
ert
where e is an exponential constant
The value of the option is related positively to all these factors except the second, the
exercise price (E). In other words, the bigger the value of the underlying asset (Ps),
the higher the interest rate (r), the longer the period for which the option is available
(t), and the greater the volatility in value of the underlying asset (Nd), the higher the
value of the option is to buy (Amram and Kulatilaka, 199939).
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Figure 1: NPV Analysis of the Three Scenarios
Successful CRM
(£ M)
No Change
(£ M)
Gradual Decline
(£ M)
CRM Investment
over 10 years
227 0 0
CRM investment
over first three years
129 0 0
Total revenue in year
10
860 500 380
Gross margin in year
10
383 200 144
Net contribution in
year 10
106 25 11
R&D in year 10 108 75 57
NPV of scenarios 133 125 98
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Figure 2: NPV Estimates for the Three Scenarios plus Trial
Scenario NPV
(£ M)
Successful CRM 133
No Change 125
Gradual Decline 98
Trial CRM 107
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Figure 3: Factors affecting the value of Westel’s CRM Real Option
Valuation Factor Value Basis of Calculation
Ps Value of the underlying asset £107 M Discounted cash flows
over project life
E Amount it costs to exercise the option £195 M Total CRM spend in the
fourth scenario
r Interest rate 15% Given by Finance
t Period for which the option is available 3 years Suggested by Mary
Nd Volatility of the underlying asset 32% Standard deviation of
cash flows from the
project.
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Figure 4: Assessing CRM Investment Scenarios with Real Options
Scenario NPV
(£ M)
Real Option Value
(£ M)
Total Value
(Real Option plus NPV,
£ M)
Successful CRM 133 0 133
No Change 125 0 125
Gradual Decline 98 0 98
Trial CRM 107 25 132
5Appendix 1: Income Statement (£M)
1: Successful CRM Scenario
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Revenue
Current 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Increased "cross sell" 12 24 42 50 62 80 84 90 100 110
New referrals 5 10 25 35 50 70 80 90 100 110
New business ideas 0 0 1.5 10 30 50 60 80 110 140
Total Revenue 517 534 568.5 595 642 700 724 760 810 860
Gross Margin % Revenue .400 .405 .410 .415 .420 .425 .430 .435 .440 .445
Gross Margin 207 216 233 247 270 298 311 331 356 383
Other* SG&A .200 .200 .195 .195 .190 .190 .190 .185 .185 .180
R&D .150 .145 .145 .140 .140 .135 .135 .130 .130 .125
Total costs% Revenue .350 .345 .340 .335 .330 .325 .325 .315 .315 .305
Other costs 181 184 193 199 212 228 235 239 255 262
Contribution excluding CRM costs 26 32 40 48 58 70 76 91 101 120
Incremental CRM Costs
Technology 40 25 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Reorganisation 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
People 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Marketing 10 10 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 70 45 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Net Contribution -44 -13 26 34 44 56 62 77 87 106
* excludes CRM programme and investment
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2: No Change Scenario
Revenue
Current 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Increased "cross sell"
New referrals
New business ideas
Total Revenue 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Gross Margin % Revenue 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Gross Margin 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Other* SG&A .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20
R&D .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15
Total costs% Revenue .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
Other costs 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175
Net Contribution 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Discounted
* excludes CRM costs
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3: Gradual Decline Scenario
Revenue
Declining Revenue 500 485 470 456 443 429 416 404 392 380
Increased "cross sell"
New referrals
New business ideas
Total Revenue 500 485 470 456 443 429 416 404 392 380
Gross Margin % Revenue .400 0.4 0.395 0.395 0.39 0.39 0.385 0.385 0.38 0.38
Gross Margin 200 194 186 180 173 167 160 156 149 144
Other* SG&A .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20 .20
R&D .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15 .15
Total costs% Revenue .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35 .35
Other costs 175 170 165 160 155 150 146 141 137 133
Net Contribution 25 24 21 21 18 17 15 14 12 11
*excludes CRM costs
861 72
4: Trial CRM Scenario
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
Revenue
Current 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Increased "cross sell" 5 8 10 42 50 62 80 90 100 110
New referrals 2 4 5 20 30 50 60 70 80 90
New business ideas 0 0 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Total Revenue 507 512 515 582 610 652 690 720 750 780
Gross Margin % Revenue .400 .400 .400 .405 .410 .415 .420 .425 .430 .435
Gross Margin 203 205 206 236 247 267 286 302 319 335
Other* SG&A .200 .200 .200 .195 .195 .190 .190 .190 .190 .190
R&D .150 .150 .150 .145 .145 .140 .140 .135 .135 .130
Total costs% Revenue .350 .350 .305 .340 .340 .330 .330 .325 .325 .320
Other costs 177 179 180 198 207 215 228 234 244 250
Contribution excluding CRM costs
Incremental CRM Costs
Technology 10 5 5 50 5 5 5 5 5 5
Reorganisation 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
People 5 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Marketing 2 2 2 15 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 22 7 7 75 14 14 14 14 14 14
Net Contribution 3 19 19 -37 26 38 45 54
9Notes for Appendix 1: Successful CRM
Revenue
This scenario assumes that the current revenue of £500M is successfully defended
through CRM. This base is augmented by layers of incremental revenues identified in
the case. The incremental revenues are estimates generated by Mary in conjunction
with partners in Sales and outside consultants with experience in CRM programme
development. In order of importance, these incremental revenues are:
 Increased cross selling to current customers. The immediate focus of CRM
is to extend and enhance that which Westel sells to its customers, leveraging
its good reputation and incumbency in major users of telecoms equipment.
Whilst there are some revenues generated in year 1, the impact of cross selling
will grow over subsequent years as Westel learns how to profit from enhanced
relationships. The rate of revenue growth decreases in the final years of the 10
year period to reflect eventual diminishing returns from cross selling.
 New referrals. The CRM programme will identify those customers for whom
Westel is adding the most value and where the relationship is strongest -
converting customers’ good will towards Westel into sales leads, references
and general endorsement of Westel’s qualities. Referrals, references and
endorsements are important win-bidding developments for large telecoms
infrastructure projects, given the amount of money and risk they entail. The
referral effect also starts slowly, grows more rapidly for a few years and then
tails off in the later years of the forecasted period.
 New business ideas. This is the most difficult area to estimate as it estimates
the ability of Westel to exploit commercially ideas that are generated through
learning from future customer interactions. The revenue generation is lagged
to the learning to reflect the time it takes to work more intimately with clients,
develop new ideas with them, assess their wider commercial potential and
introduce the new ideas to a larger number of customers. The forecast suggests
that it will take almost four years to realise any significant income from this
form of learning from customers.
Gross margin
CRM will allow Westel to allocate better its resources and re-engineer its business
processes to provide more of what its best customers value and less of what customers
do not appreciate or are unwilling to pay for. This better matching of resources and
processes to customer value will reduce costs incurred that add little value and allow
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Westel to produce more valued services and products, which all else being equal,
should sell at premium prices. The revenue from this is assumed to be lagged by one
year to the start of CRM but adds one-half point of margin thereafter. The final figure
of 44.5% is considered by Mary to be achievable in consideration of her analysis of
best-practice competitors.
Other Costs
These increase in absolute terms over 10 years but not as fast as income. For example,
R&D increases from its current level of £75 M (15% of £500 M turnover) to £107.5
M (12.5% of year 10 turnover). Moreover, R&D priorities will be more targeted on
specific customer opportunities and hence less speculative and more cost-effective.
Incremental CRM Costs
Technology
This comprises CRM software implementation over 18 months. The major
components are sales force automation, new customer contact (call) centre, enhanced
web access, new customer database, new database analysis tools and improved
integration of the contact centre with Westel’s logistic and billing systems. Integrating
these new sales, marketing and service systems together and then to the back office
support systems is a major systems development. The logistics and billing systems
had not been built to integrate seamlessly into new, state-of-the-art front office
systems that Westel would need and would require extensive use of outside systems
development and integration consultants. The new front office equipment would
stretch existing computer hardware and servers beyond their capability and new
equipment would be needed.
The key investments are as follows:
New sales systems to 1000 field sales people £10,000,000
New lap tops to field sales people 5,000,000
New sales systems to 500 desk based sales people 2,500,000
New service software for 1000 service people 5,000,000
New marketing systems for 500 marketers 2,500,000
Other new hardware (servers, LANs, etc) 2,500,000
New database and analytical tools 5,000,000
Systems integration, process development (consulting fees) 17,500,000
Upgrades to logistics and billing systems 15,000,000
Total 65,000,000
11
The investment was front loaded with £40M in the first year and £25 M in year two.
Commencing in year three, IT estimated an ongoing cost of £5 M per annum for
software upgrades, license fees and miscellaneous new maintenance costs.
Reorganisation
The sales force would be reorganised into profit-responsible customer teams and lead
Westel's business and product planning processes. It would need new competencies in
customer development, planning, financial analysis, risk assessment and budgeting.
Product groups would need a reorientation to adapt a more “listen and serve”
approach to their jobs. This represented the biggest-ever change for Westel’s Sales
organisation in its history.
After advice from change-management consulting firms, Mary estimated an 18 month
implementation of the change with £15 million, one-off cost spread equally over the
period; £10 million in year one and £5 million in the second year. The costs relate to
hiring outside change-management consultants and facilities, food and travel for the
attendant workshops and re-training sessions.
People
Not all the current Westel people would be able and or willing to make the transition
from a product to a customer-led structure. Mary estimated that 20% of the current
marketing and sales people would either leave or be replaced during the first 18
months of the CRM implementation.
Mary worked with HR specialists to estimate the costs involved. In considering the
people, their flexibility and ongoing level of staff turnover, the specialists suggest a
first year cost of £10 million relating to personal coaching and training for those that
can make the transition to key account management, coaching of others to consider
other opportunities within Westel and severance pay for those that will neither make
the transition to the new organisation nor find an acceptable position elsewhere. There
will be only limited recruitment from the outside in the first year of the CRM
programme to allow Westel people the best opportunity and minimise disruption.
Thereafter, there is a cost of £5M per annum for recruiting new people and additional
severance pay.
Marketing
Westel did not traditionally spend heavily in marketing, instead relying on its
reputation and sales force for reputation and positioning. Current marketing budgets
were hard to estimate as spending was fragmented across individual product groups
and not always identified as marketing. Mary was convinced that repositioning Westel
from hardware vendor to solutions-partner would require a much larger investment in
marketing communications behind the corporate brand. Westel had never before
invested specifically in corporate brand building.
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During the first two years of the change programme, Mary budgeted for a £20 million
global communication programme directed at customers and opinion-formers. The
objectives of the communication programme were to promote the new strategy and
discourage rumours that Westel lacks a clear strategy. Thereafter marketing budgets
would fall to approx. £4 million per annum, but not to the very low current levels.
Mary felt that as Westel changed its focus from product-marketing to customer-
solutions, it would need to maintain a strong corporate brand to endorse its credentials
as a long-term business partner.
Notes for Appendix 1: Trial CRM
Mary is able to identify a limited number of customers with whom Westel can engage
in the type of relationship that is planned for all customers under the “successful CRM
scenario”. The technology, reorganisation, people and marketing investments required
are as per above, but on a much smaller scale. Many of the software solutions can be
delayed during the trial in favour of enhancements to current systems and additional
staff. These short-term fixes are not scaleable to support all of Westel’s business but
can be operated for a limited time for a limited number of companies.
This scenario illustrates a three year investment that is successful and hence allows
Westel to extend CRM across the company in year 4. The slower pace of
implementation is actually less expensive in a few areas over a four year period
because it avoids the disruptiveness of quick-paced, major change (e.g. People costs).
However the major assumptions about the extent and pace of incremental revenue
development and technology costs are very similar to those used in the successful
CRM scenario albeit lagged to reflect the three year test market.
